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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BONNEVILLE BILLING, 
Plaintifi&Appellee, 
vs. Case No. 970148-CA 
RICKWHATLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of the present appeal in accordance with a pour-
over order of the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), U.C.A. 
ISSUE OF APPEAL 
Did the lower court err in refusing to quash service or set aside a default 
judgment when service of process was improper and there was no jurisdiction 
conferred upon the Court? A denial of a motion to vacate a judgement under Rule 
60(b) is ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a 
motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district 
court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand 
without denying due process to the one against whom it runs. State Dept. of 
Social Servs. v. Viiil 784 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1989). 
APPLICABLE RULES 
Rule 4(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states the following: 
Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are 
unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence,... the 
party seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit 
requesting an order allowing service by publication, by mail, or by some 
other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to 
identify, locate, or serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which 
make it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. If the motion is 
granted, the court shall order service of process by publication, by mail 
from the clerk of the court, by other means, or by some combination of the 
above, provided that the means of notice implied shall be reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of 
the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. 
The court's order shall also specify the content of the process to be served 
and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed complete. A 
copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with the 
process specified by the court. 
Rule 55 states: 
(a) Default 
(1) *** 
(2) Notice to Party in Default. After the entry of the default 
of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall 
not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of action 
taken or to be taken or to serve any notice or papers otherwise 
required by these rules to be served on a party to the action or 
proceeding, except as provided in Rule 5(a). In Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing 
with regard to the amount of damages of the non-defaulting 
party. 
Rule58A. 
* * * 
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(d) Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment. The prevailing party 
shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all 
other parties and shall file proof of service of such notice with the Clerk 
of the Court. However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not 
affected by the notice requirement of this provision. 
Rule 60(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (3) fraud 
(whether a heretofore nominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; 
(5) the judgment is void;... or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The following is a factual and procedural synopsis of the pertinent events 
relevant to this appeal. In 1990 the defendant-appellant Rick Whatley was married 
to Maiyam Whatley. In August of that year she executed two agreements with two 
separate physicians to pay for medical services. In the agreements she listed her 
husband as the person responsible for the account and gave his business address as 
50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. After incurring charges for medical 
services the medical providers assigned their collections to the plaintiff-appellee 
Bonneville Billing and Collections. 
In a complaint filed February 11, 1992 by appellee's attorney Steven 
Kaufman, the appellees requested a joint judgment against Maiyam and Rick for 
$3,500 plus approximately $700 in attorneys' fees. (R. 1-2). The returned 
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summons filed with the Cleric contained the name of the defendant Rick Whatley 
as well as the information listed by his wife on the medical agreement "Kemper 
Financial, 50 West Broadway". The constable crossed out "50 West Broadway" 
and inserted "Not here. They believe he works out of Long Beach, California 
office." 
The certification of the constable stated the following: 
I hereby certify and return that I received the within and hereto 
annex, summons and complaint on the 18 day of February, 1992, and after 
due search and diligent inquiry, I am unable to find the within named 
defendant, Whatley, Rick at 50 West Broadway—not here in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and I am reliably informed and do verily believe that 
said defendant is unable to be located at the above stated address. Dated 
this 21st day of February, 1992. Signed: John A. Sindt Constable's Office 
by Bill Buttars, Deputy. 
The summons and return was filed with the clerk on April 30, 1992. (R. 
179-80). 
On April 13, 1992 after the attempted service but prior to the filing of the 
summons and return with the Clerk, Plaintiff made a "Motion and Order for 
Alternative Service by Mailing" and submitted an Affidavit of Attorney Kaufinan 
in its support. (R. 3-6; see Appendix to Brief). 
In the Affidavit, attorney Kaufinan stated: 
That the plaintiff has attempted to send mail to the defendant at 
his/her last known residence address of P. O. Box 1182, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84110-1182 and same has been returned with the notation that the 
defendant has moved and has left no forwarding address. Plaintiff is 
unaware of the defendant's current residence address. 
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The defendant is employed at Kemper Financial, and plaintiff has 
attempted to serve defendant at his place of employment; however, the 
personnel at Kemper Financial would not allow the defendant to be 
personally served there. 
Apparently on March 29, 1992, based upon the representations made in the 
affidavit, Judge Thome entered the following: 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that service in this matter 
shall be effected by the Clerk of the Court by mailing a copy of the 
summons and complaint to the defendant, in care of his employer, Kemper 
Financial and that thirty days after mailing, service shall be deemed 
complete. Dated this 29th day of March 1992. By the Court. (R. 5-6; see 
Appendix.) (Emphasis added). 
The mailing certificate filed by the Clerk stated: 
I mailed a copy of the summons and complaint in the above matter to 
the defendant in care of his place of employment of Kemper Financial 50 
West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 postage prepaid this 30th day 
of April, 1992. By the Clerk of the Court. (R. 7-8) (Emphasis added). 
On June 11, 1992 a Default and Default Judgment was entered by Judge 
Thome against defendant Rick Whatley and Maryam Whatley. (R. 11-13). A 
Notice of Judgment was filed on June 25, 1992 by attorney Kaufman. The 
Certificate of Mailing stated that this Notice of Judgment had been sent to Maryam 
Whatley and Rick Whatley at P. O. Box 1182, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
In 1995 various writs of garnishment were issued against appellant 
Whatley. On November 6, 1995 a special appearance by attorney Jay Barney and 
a Motion to Quash Service and to Set Aside Default Judgment was made. (R. 27-
28). Concurrently, an affidavit of appellant Rick Whatley was filed with the 
court. (R. 25-26; see Appendix to Brief). Mr. Whatley disputed any claim that he 
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was working for Kemper Financial at the time of service and stated that he had 
terminated his employment and left the state to work in California. He stated, 
"Defendant, by virtue of the foregoing, would not have received any mail directed 
to Kemper Financial at 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah on or near April 
30, 1992." 
Defendant in his memorandum argued that the Affidavit in Support of the 
authority to serve by mail was deficient and was inconsistent with the court's own 
record and that the judgment against the defendant was void under Rule 60(b)(5) 
since there was no jurisdiction attaching to the matter. (R. 29-35). 
Various other procedural events occurred after the initiation of the 
appellant's attempt to vacate the judgment. Judge Judith Atherton allowed the 
plaintiff to file an affidavit of one of its employees. (R. 50-52). Appellant filed an 
objection to this Affidavit based upon impermissible hearsay and moved to strike. 
(R. 53-54). 
On June 5, 1996 Judge Atherton entered an order striking the affidavit of 
Plaintiffs employee but denying Defendant's Motion to Quash Service and Set 
Aside the Default Judgment. Judge Atherton stated: 
The order permitting service was reasonable pursuant to Rule 4(g), 
U.R.C.P., that service by mail was as likely to apprise the defendant of the 
impending action as any other form of service. Defendant did not submit 
any address other than Kemper Financial on the Clayton Plastic Surgery 
application. (R. 78-79). (See Appendix). 
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Subsequently, on June 10, 1996 Appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend 
the Judgment based upon Rule 59. (R. 80-81). Defendant-Appellant argued that 
the evidence as presented was insufficient to justify the decision denying 
Defendant's Motion to Quash. (R. 82-91). 
On November 8, 1996 the Court denied the Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment of June 5, 1996. The Court stated, "In reaching this decision the Court 
has weighed again the issues surrounding the granting of plaintiffs motion for 
service by publication of March 29, 1992 and again finds that service by mail was 
as likely to apprise defendant of the pending action as any other form of service." 
It is from the original judgment and the denial of this Motion to Alter or 
Amend that the present appeal is taken. (R. 166-67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in failing to grant relief against the judgment entered 
in this case against the defendant Rick Whatley in that the initial service of 
process giving the court jurisdiction over the defendant was clearly defective. 
While obviously the judge at the time of allowing substitute service was not aware 
that the affidavit filed by Plaintiffs attorney was completely inconsistent with the 
actual return of service by the constable, the reviewing lower court should have 
granted relief once this inconsistency was shown and once the affidavit of 
Defendant himself was filed stating that the address utilized for service was no 
longer his company or location. 
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In addition, the use of alternative service is itself defective in that the Court 
and the Clerk of the Court did not comply with the clear rule of Rule 4(g) relating 
to alternative service and Plaintiff did not give Defendant proper notice of the 
judgment 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT ENTERED 
AGAINST DEFENDANT ON THE BASIS 
THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS VOID FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION SINCE PERSONAL 
SERVICE HAD NEVER BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. 
Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an opportunity for 
alternative methods of service where the identity or whereabouts of the person to 
be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence. 
The party seeking the alternative service process must file a motion supported by 
an affidavit. The Affidavit "shall set forth the effort made to identify, locate, or 
serve the party to be served." 
The record in this case shows that a deputy constable attempted to serve the 
defendant at 50 West Broadway at the business office of Kemper Financial. The 
constable in executing the summons and return specifically stated that Defendant 
was no longer at that location but was believed to be working in Long Beach, 
California. 
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Based upon that information alone, the plaintiff and its attorney should 
have attempted to locate the new business office of the defendant in Long Beach, 
California before making any representation whatsoever. However, the affidavit 
of Mr. Kaufman completely distorts and misleads the court by failing to mention 
the California reference and by specifically stating that the employees in the Salt 
Lake office would not permit the constable to personally serve the defendant. 
There has been nothing filed by the plaintiff in this case to explain the 
blatant inconsistency between the constable's return and the affidavit of Mr. 
Kaufman. No affidavit of Mr. Kaufman has been filed to supplement where this 
information was gathered. No effort has been made by plaintiff to show why 
further inquiry was not conducted by plaintiffs agents as to the California 
location. 
The nature of our civil proceedings is to afford opportunity of notification 
for an individual against whom a claim is made. There is no evidence before this 
Court that the defendant willfully removed himself from the jurisdiction or was 
avoiding service of process. The evidence indicates that the defendant had left the 
state for employment purposes almost two years prior to the attempted service and 
that the Court in this case was asked to grant service by mail upon an affidavit 
void of a reasonable diligent search. See Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev 
Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). The lower court determined that there was 
reasonable basis to serve Mr. Whatley by mail through Kemper Financial because 
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such information appeared upon the Clayton Plastic Surgery Specialists medical 
form. The decision of the Judge Atherton to find sufficient service on this 
assumption was clearly erroneous. 
First, the form was filled out in August of 1990 but the service did not 
occur until February 1992. There is nothing in Rule 4 which allows a defendant to 
be served at his last known address even if the person no longer lives or works 
there at the time of service. Llovd v. Third Judicial District Court. 495 P.2d 1262 
(Utah 1972) (notice of action at last known address insufficient to invoke a court's 
jurisdiction). A plaintiff must make a good faith effort to locate a defendant based 
upon all available information and if the defendant still cannot be located, then 
Rule 4(g) must be followed explicitly. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 
1986). 
Second, the information given in the plastic surgery form was filled out and 
signed by Maryam Whatley and not by Rick Whatley. Thus, contrary to the 
decision of the lower court, Mr. Whatley did not submit any address on the 
Clayton form although his wife did supply an address. Somehow, the lower court 
believed that this form was a constructive service allowing the plaintiff to serve 
him at the address of 50 West Broadway regardless of whether he was there or not. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an affidavit required under 
subdivision (f) [now (g)] is not sufficient if it states mere conclusions as to diligent 
search and inquiry of a defendant; it must state facts upon which a court can base 
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ajudgment as to whether such diligence has been exercised to meet that 
requirement. Downey State Bank v. Major Blakenev Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 
1976). 
There is a world of difference between the two situations shown by the 
record in this case: (1) according to plaintiffs attorney Defendant was working at 
50 West Broadway but the process server was barred from entering it and serving 
him. In this case a court would certainly be justified in allowing service by mail. 
(2) The affidavit of Mr. Whatley and the summons and return of the constable 
shows that he was not at that location and had not been employed by that business 
for two years. It is doubtful that the Court, had it known these facts, would have 
allowed mailing to a business where Mr. Whatley no longer worked. 
Rule 65(b)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to relieve a 
party from a final judgment where the judgment is void. Ajudgment is void if a 
lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record. Bowen v. Olsen. 146 P.2d 
602 (Utah 1952). The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time at trial or 
on appeal. Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243 (Utah, 1993). If an affidavit for 
publication or mailing presents no evidence or facts—or in this case—inaccurate 
facts, then a default judgment entered against the defendant may be collaterally 
attacked. Bowen, supra. When a motion to vacate ajudgment is based on a claim 
of lack of jurisdiction, the court has no discretion. If jurisdiction is lacking, the 
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judgment cannot stand without denying process to the one against whom it runs. 
Dept of Social Servs. v. ViiiL 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989\ 
Here, Plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant based upon 
information which was grossly inaccurate and which plaintiff knew, or should 
have known, would not provide opportunity for defendant to receive notice of the 
proceedings against him. Information received from the very place of business 
where service was attempted indicated that the defendant no longer worked at that 
office but was instead in California. Notwithstanding this fact, Plaintiff sought to 
serve defendant at a location where the evidence was reasonable and clear that 
defendant would not receive notice of the proceedings. The issuing judge was 
simply not informed as to the true facts regarding the request for substituted 
service. 
Judge Atherton in denying the Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside 
Judgment concluded that "service by mail was likely to apprise Defendant of the 
pending action as any other form of service." This conclusion is completely 
unwarranted. While service by publication, for example, is a remote means of 
notifying a defendant of service it is, nevertheless, a process by which the 
defendant or an acquaintance who monitors such publications would be aware of 
the lawsuit. On the other hand, sending notice to a large corporation where the 
defendant has not worked for two years is even more improbable for actual 
notification. 
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In any event, Judge Atherton missed the point. The question should not 
have been which was the most probable way of serving the defendant but should 
have been whether the affidavits filed by the plaintiffs attorney completely 
distorted the true facts of service causing the issuing judge to be misled into 
believing that service would be proper in view of the failure of the corporation 
officials to allow a constable inside premises. 
Likewise, the decision by Judge Atherton on November 8, 1996 denying 
defendant's Motion to Alter to Amend Judgment was also based upon the 
likelihood of apprisal rather than on the sufficiency of the Rule 4 motion. Judge 
Atherton failed to focus upon the correct inquiry, i.e., what the evidence existing 
in the record showed to be the state of affairs allowing substitute service. The 
summons and return of the constable has to be the best evidence of the attempted 
service. The affidavit of Mr. Kaufman was at best hearsay and at worst 
completely inaccurate hearsay. The Affidavit of Mr. Whatley was directly 
admissible evidence as to his location and status at the time of service. 
This combined evidence should have compelled Judge Atherton to strike 
the judgment on the basis of no jurisdiction because of improper service. 
POINT H 
THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE PERMITTED BY THE 
LOWER COURT WAS ITSELF DEFECTIVE THEREBY 
NEGATING JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT. 
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Under Rule 4(g) if a court elects to use an alternate form of service certain 
procedural safeguards must also apply. Part of this rule states, "The Court's order 
shall also specify the content of the process to be served in the event or events as 
to which service shall be deemed complete. A copy of the Court's order shall be 
served upon the defendant with the process specified by the Court." Proof of 
proper service is required to safeguard against entering default judgments except 
against parties who have consented thereto. Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 111 
(Utah 1955). The requirements of this rule relating to service of process are 
jurisdictional and cannot be ignored. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). 
The order of the lower court allowing alternative service stated that the 
Clerk of the Court should mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the 
defendant in care of his employer Kemper Financial and that thirty days after the 
mailing "service shall be deemed complete." (R. 6). The mailing certificate of the 
clerk stated, "I mailed a copy of the summons and complaint in the above matter to 
the defendant in care of his/her place of employment at Kemper Financial, 50 
West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 postage prepaid this 30th day of 
April, 1992." (R. 7). 
Neither the court order nor the mailing certificate indicates that the mailing 
included the required copy of the Court's order for alternative service. 
Since a defendant who is served by alternate service is entitled to know 
why such service has occurred, and what event or events shall be deemed to 
14 
complete service, the failure to include this order in the mailing voids any 
purported service made of the defendant. The lower court therefor lacked 
jurisdiction to enter judgment. 
POINT HI 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROPERLY NOTIFY 
THE DEFENDANT THAT DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
HAD BEEN ENTERED. 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that upon default the 
prevailing party shall notify the defendant of such default in accordance with Rule 
58A(d). 
Rule 58A(b) states that 64the prevailing party shall promptly give notice of 
the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service 
of such notice with the Clerk of the Court." 
On June 25,1992, over two months after the original Affidavit of Attorney 
Kaufman was filed with the Court, the Notice of Judgment was entered by the 
Clerk of the Court which evidenced a certificate of mailing to the defendant at 
P.O. Box 1182, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On April 2, 1992 Mr. Kaufman made the following statement in his 
Affidavit: 
That the plaintiff has attempted to send mail to the defendants at 
his/her last known residence address of P.O. Box 1182, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84110-1182 and same has been refused with the notation that the 
defendant has moved and has left no forwarding address. Plaintiff is 
unaware of the defendant's current residence address. (R. 3) (Emphasis 
added). 
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Thus, the notice of the default judgment which is sent to a defendant to 
apprise him of the procedure that has been instituted against him was intentionally 
sent to an address which plaintiff knew would not reach the defendant. Plaintiff 
did not even attempt to mail the notice of default to the 50 West Broadway address 
which had been previously approved by the Court as the place of proper service. 
The failure to send proper notice of the default judgment also invalidated 
the original judgment. The failure to serve a proper notice of default by the 
prevailing party has been held by this Court to be an element to consider in 
granting a Rule 60B motion. Workman v. Nagle Construction. Inc.. 802 P.2d 749 
(Utah App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
Many years ago the Utah Supreme Court stated the proposition that 
judgments by default are not favored by the Court nor are they in the interest of 
justice and fair play. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 
1962). Likewise, the procedures to be followed by trial courts in entering 
judgments against defaulting parties are clearly prescribed and courts are not at 
liberty to deviate from those rules just because one party is in default and is not 
entitled to be heard on the merits of the case. Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1984). 
In the instant case, Judge Thome was initially justified in ordering the 
alternative service based upon the representations made to him by Plaintiffs 
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attorney. Judge Thome was unaware that the defendant was no longer in the State 
of Utah, was no longer working for Kemper Financial, and that the employees of 
Kemper had not refused entry to the constable for service of the defendant. 
Likewise, Judge Thome was probably unaware that his order of alternative service 
had not been served in the mailing of the Clerk or that the Notice of Judgment was 
sent to a clearly deadend address. Defendant finds no fault in the actions of Judge 
Thome. 
In reviewing this past history, however, Judge Atherton clearly erred in 
failing to find sufficient grounds to set aside the judgment on the basis that 
improper service had occurred and jurisdiction had not attached. Upon review of 
the complete file including the return of service of the constable together with the 
uncontroverted affidavit of the defendant, Judge Atherton should have set aside the 
judgment. Clearly, defendant did not receive actual or constructive notice of this 
lawsuit giving him an opportunity to defend himself. 
Aside from the legal sufficiency of service, even if it is assumed arguendo 
that Judge Thome properly entered an alternate service procedure, this procedure 
itself was deficient by the failure of the clerk to certify that the Court's order of 
alternate service had itself been served on the defendant with the summons and 
complaint. This deficiency existing in the file now before this Court clearly 
invalidates any purported service on the defendant. 
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Finally, the intentional mailing of the Notice of Judgment to a deadend 
address is the final factor to be used in vacating this judgment. 
Because of all of these irregularities, misrepresentations, and misapplication 
of legal principles, the defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
decision of the lower court and set aside the judgment now entered against him. 
DATED this 13th day of May, 1997. 
Craig S. Coo^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, 2970 South Main Street, 
Suite 202 B, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 this 13th day of May, 1997. 
c>^^^< ^Lj^w^— 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE.THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARYYAM WHATLY, 
Defendant. : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 920003569CV 
JUDGE JUDITH ATHERTON 
This motion came on for hearing October 1, 1996, on Defendant's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Order and Judgment of June 5, 1996. Having heard arguments of counsel and 
having received legal memoranda, the Court denies the Motion. 
Defendant has not provided sufficient additional information to the Court the revisit 
the denial of his 60(b) motion. In reaching this decision the Court has weighed again the 
issues surrounding the granting of Plaintiffs motion for Service by Publication of March 29, 
1992, and again finds that service by mail was as likely to apprise Defendant of the pending 
action as any other form of service. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 1996. 
BY THE,CfOURT: %. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision and Order to: Jay V Barney, Attorney for Defendant, 10885 South State, Sandy 
UT 84070 and to Wilford N Hansen Jr, Attorney for Plaintiff, 2970 South Main Suite 202B, 
SLC UT 84115. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 1996. 
/? /. , 
Cih 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & 
COLLECTIONS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARYAM WHATLEY and 
RICK WHATLEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 920003569CV 
JUDGE JUDITH S H ATHERTON 
Having reviewed the file, motions, and affidavits, the Court hereby makes the 
following ruling: 
Defendant's Motion to Strike the affidavit of Mike Roger is granted. 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Service and to Set Aside Default Judgment is denied. 
The Order permitting service was reasonable pursuant to rule 4 (g), U.R.C.P., that 
service by mail was as likely to apprise Defendant of the pending action as any other form of 
service. Defendant did not submit any address other than Kemper Financial on the Clayton 
Plastic Surgery application . 
• • 
DATED this 5th day of June, 1996. 
^ l i d g e J&a^S. H. Ath&tqMJ 7 ? 
* • * * & ' ' ' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to Jay V. 
Barney, Attorney at Law, 10885 South State Street, Sandy UT 84070, and to Wilford N 
Hansen, Jr., Attorney at Law, 2970 South Main, Suite 202 B, SLC UT 84115. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 1996. 
f)hiJ 
j 
JAY V. BARNEY (0224) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAR YAM WHATLEY and RICK WHATLEY 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICK WHATLEY 
Civil No. 92CV3569 
STATE OF UTAH } 
} ss 
County of Salt Lake } 
I, Rick Whatley, being first duly sworn upon do depose and state: 
1. That I am presently a resident of the state of Utah, residing in Salt Lake County. 
2. On or near June of 1995, while processing an application for a real estate loan, 
I was advised that there was a debt claimed against me by Bonneville Collections. 
3. That contact was made with a representative of Bonneville Collections at which 
time I first learned that a judgment had been entered against me with respect to this case. 
4. That I have never been personally served with process in the above entitled action 
and further, I have reviewed an affidavit of Mr. Steven M. Kaufman, esq. filed with the above 
entitled court on or near March 2, 1992. 
5. That said affidavit is not accurate in that it indicates that I was employed at 
Kemper Financial in Salt Lake City, Utah, as of the date thereof. 
6. Affiant was employed by Kemper Financial in or near 1990. However, Defendant 
terminated his employment with Kemper Financial and left the state of Utah to work for 
Prudential Securities in Seal Beach, California. Affiant remained in that position and in the state 
of California until his return to Utah in or near June, 1992. 
7. Defendant has never been served with process with respect to the above case, 
either personally or by mail, to an address with which Defendant was affiliated either as a 
residence or as a business address. Further, Defendant, by virtue of the foregoing, would not 
have received any mail directed to Kemper Financial at 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 
on or near April 30, 1992. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this JL day of ^f^ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thisJ^T day of November, 1995. 
Affix Seal: 
$ g g & ROTARY PUBLIC 
X ^ r O " ' Wy Comm,ss/on Exom August 20. m I 
_ g T * T E Q F U T A H ' • 
Notary Public 
JAY V. BARNEY (0224) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARYAM WHATLEY and RICK WHATLEY 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL APPEARANCE, 
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE 
AND TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT; 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUEST 
Civil No. 92CV3569 
Defendant, Rick Whatley, through his counsel, Jay V. Barney, herewith appears 
specially and moves to quash service and to set aside default judgment in die above entitled case 
entered on or near June 11, 1992. 
The basis of the motion of Defendant is more fully addressed in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion To Quash and To Set Aside Default Judgment and the 
affidavit of Mr. Rick Whatley accompanying this motion. 
Defendant also requests oral argument in the above case pursuant to the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
DATED this 3_ day ofjfl&tJi 
Defendant 
is.Wio 
"if/ <--. 
C I R C U I T C O U R T , S " 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, yJEST 
O R U T A H 
BONNEVILLE 3ILLIN6 £i 
£970 S. Miin St . #£02 
3LC, Utah 34163 
425-10G5/54&-332S 
COLLECTIONS: INC 
Pla int i f f 
NOTICE OF JUD6fC.Nl 
MARYAM WriATLV 
RICK WHATLY 
PO BOX U S E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT - U S E 
Dsfendant C I V I L # , r£CV£5 t? 
Judae WILLIAM A THORNE 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT(3): 
toe 
r* r. -. 
You will please tak^ net ice, thf.l an 06-11-92. judgment *>a£ enters 
.inst VOL: in. the above-entitled action in the cotal amount or $ 27£I . 
:sthsr with interest thereon -at the >*ate of 12 per annum rrciH th^ 
e of said 7.«dg.Tient until fully p^id, Said Judgment incl^ae* ? 130, 
attorney foe- a no £ 35.00 £3 cost; ot suit. 
••judgment rtKEQiz^ are pursued, additional, attorney 
.= t.-H? nav be awaroeu . 
-,*«.. ... 
:«T:.int t o : 
PIC!-:' :^HATL/ 
PO 20x U S E 
Vw'«* J 
STEVEN M. KAUFMAN (#1777) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN 
GORMAN, JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-5526 
S12450 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY , WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTIONS 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MARYAM WHATLY & RICK WHATLY 
PO BOX 1182 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84110 
Defendant(s ) ] 
DEFAULT AND 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No .92CV3569 
BASED ON THE RECORD, THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT( S):MARYAM WHATLY AND 
RICK WHATLY HAS/HAVE DEFAULTED AMD THE DEFfiMLST) IS HEREBY ENTERED: 
DATED this // day of L_ 
IHA N F^JdW) 
>T If Ij^V/lA 1? fiT 
BY THE COUR 
BY: 
DEPUTY CLERK 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
THE DEFENDANT MARYAM WHATLY HAVING FAILED TO PLEASE OR OTHERWISE 
DEFEND IN THIS ACTION AND DEFAULT HAVING BEEN ENTERED, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF ABOVE-NAMED BE AWARDED JUDGMENT AGAINST SAID 
DEFENDANT MARYAM WHATLY, INDIVIDUALLY: 
Principle 
Date of last charge 8-6-90 
Accrued Interest 
Accrued costs to date of Judgment 
Attorney's Fees 
TOTAL 
$3305 .60 
$ 231 .35 
$ 35.00 
S 150.00 
$372lT95 
THE DEFENDANT RICK WHATLY HAVING FAILED TO PLEASE OR 
DEFEND IN THIS ACTION AND DEFAULT HAVING BEEN ENTERED, IT 
ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF ABOVE-NAMED BE AWARDED JUDGMENT AGAIN* 
DEFENDANT RICK WHATLY, INDIVIDUALLY: 
OTHERWISE 
IS HEREBY 
SAID 
Pri nciple 
Date of last charge 8-6-90 
Accrued Interest 
Accrued costs to date of Judgment 
$3305.60 
S 231 .35 
% 35.00 
Attorney's Fees 
TOTAL $3571.95 
WITH INTEREST ON THE TOTAL AT 12% PER^ S^ffi-JF^ &^ JPROVIDED BY LAW' 
THE DATE OF THIS JUDGMENT UNTIL RAID/, g£DS A^JfR-^CRUING COSTS 
DATED this [/ day of 
• - • / 
Ente red : £>••?< 
V * 7 
CIRCUIT.JUDGE OF 
^ERK 'I)F THE CIRCUIT COURT 
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
9940 
P 3 / 8 ISS2 
STEVEN M. KAUFMAN (21777) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN 
GORMAN, JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 844C1 
Telephone: 394-5526 
'1245^ : 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECT! 
A Utah Corporation 
Ogden 621-7SS0 
Salt Lake City 485-1005 
Orem 224-5444 
:ONS 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MARYAM LiRATLY 
R I C K UHATL'V 
SERVE MR AT ^ E 
^ »•> /•> ^ <-> i i «, > A 
W W -U 
KEEPER FINANCIAL 
•5-LC UT 33A-0CSS 
S U M M O N S 
( 1 0 D A Y S ) 
C i v i l No: 
Defencant/s 
TnE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED AND REQUIRED TO FILE WITH THE 
CLERK OF THE AECVE COURT A WRITTEN ANSWER TO A COMPLAINT TO BE 
FILED IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT, AND TO SERVE UPON OR MAI. TO 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEV, AT THE ADDRESS SHOWN ABOVE, A COPY OF YOUR 
ANSWER WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THE SERVICE OF THIS SUMMONS 
UPON YOU. THE COMPLAINT WILL BE FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE AECVE 
CCUPT WITHIN TEN (10) D~v3 ^"ER SERVICE CF THIS SUMMONS UPON YCU , 
AND A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT IS ATTACHED HERETO AND SERVED HEREWITH 
UPON YOU. 
IF YCU FAIL T0 ANSWER, JUDGMENT EY DEFAUL" WILL BE ~AKEN 
AGAINST YCU FOR THE RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT. THE RELIEF 
DEMANDED IS AS PRAYED FOR IN THE ATTACHED COMPLi^T . 
DATED February 
DATE 
UPON. 
S1N0T-
.T1ME VS5 
; = ^ C i C v c :M 
BISTABLE S.L CCl'NTY. UTAH A t t o r n e y 
u o u r 1 A c d r e s s : 3 6 3 6 S 2 7 0 0 M , W C Z V A L L E Y C I T Y , UT S £ l l < 
STATE OF UTAH 
• =s Constable's Unable to Locate Return 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE > 
I hereby c e r t i f y and return that I received ihe a i t h in and hereto annexed, SUMMONS ci COMPLAINT 
on the 18 day of FEBRUARY , 1992 • and after due search and diligent inquiry, I am unable to find ihe 
within named defendant, UHATLY, RICK > at 50 U BROADWAY - WOT HERE 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and I am re l iab ly informed and do ve r i l y believe that said defendant is 
unable to be located a^ the above stated address* 
Da Tea • This 21 day of FEBRUARY .• 1992 • 
John A* Sindt, Constable's Office* Salt Lake County, State of Utah* 
Deputy 
Fee's 
Mileage* $ 
: $ 
: $ 
TOTAL: $ 
COMMENTS; NOT HERE NO CHARGE 
99404 13 MA 
STEVEN M. KAUFMAN (#1777) of 
FARR , KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN 
GORMAN, JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-5526 
312450 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTIONS 
A Utah Corporation 
Ogden 621-7880 
Salt Lake City 485-1005 
Orem 224-5444 
Plaintiff, 
VS 
MARYAM UJHATLY & R I C K U1HATLY 
Defendant/s 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Civil No.: 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the Summons and 
Complaint in the above matter to the defendant in care of his/her 
place of employment of Kemper Financial, 50 U). Broadway, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84101, postage prepaid this ^ji_) da y of M$*" z>fT, 1992 . 
CLERK OF' THE ' C'OURTX 
By : c$. ^ Ui;f 
Deputy 
- \7sJ*** 
75^35--j 
STEVEN M. KAUFMAN (#1777) of 
FARR , KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN 
GORMAN, JENSEN, MEDSKER h PERKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-5526 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
312450 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTIONS 
A Utah Corporation 
Ogden 621-7880 
Salt Lake City 485-1005 
Orem 224-5444 
Plaintiff , 
VS 
MARYAM UJHATLY & RICK WHATLY 
Defendant/s 
MOTION AND ORDER FDR 
ALTERNATIVE SERVICE BY 
MAILING 
C i v i l No.: 
93)00635^1 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, by and through counsel, STEv/EN 
M. KAUFMAN, and moved the Court for an order allowing service to 
be effected upon the aefendant herein by the Clerk of the Cojrt 
mailing a copy of the Summons and Complaint to the defendant, RICK 
WHATLY in care of his place of employment, Kemper Financial, 50 W. 
Broadway, Salt Lake City, UT 84101. Said motion 
is based upon the attached Affidavit and is made for the reason 
that the plaintiff believes that mailing to the Defendant in care 
of his place of employment is more likely to to give the defendant 
actual notice of this lawsuit than publication in the local 
newspaper. 
Dated this )I day of March, \) 
DTEy^f M . KAUFMAN 
Attorney for Playrf&fff 
O R D E R 
Based upon the motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good 
cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that service 
in this matter shall be effected by the Clerk of the Court mailing 
a copy of the Summons and Complaint to the defendant, in care of 
his employer, Kemper Financial, and that 30 days after mailing, 
service shall be deemed complete. 
Dated this ^ * J day of March, l.9&2??^ 
CIRCUIT £f0URT JUDGE 
STEVEN M. KAUFMAN (31777) of 312^50 25 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN 
GORMAN, JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 844Q1 
Telephone: 394-5526 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTIONS 
A Utah Corporation 
Ogden 621-7880 
Salt Lake City 485-1005 
Orem 224-5444 
Plaintiff , 
VS 
MARYAM UJHATLY & RICK UIHATLY 
Defendant/s . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UIEBER ) 
STEVEN M. KAUFMAN, ESQ., being first duly sworn upon 
oath, deposes and says. 
1. He is the attorney for the plaintiff in the above 
entitled action, and has personal knowledge of the facts set forth 
in this affidavit. 
2. That the plaintiff has attempted to send mail to the 
defendants at his/her last known residence address of Po Box 1182, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1182 and same has been returned with the 
notation that the defendant has moved and has left no forwarding 
address. Plaintiff is unaware of the defendant's current residence 
address . 
3. The defendant is employed at Kemper Financial, and 
plaintiff has attempted to serve the defendant at his place of 
employment; however, the personnel at Kemper Financial would not 
allow the defendant to be personally served there. 
A F F I D A V I T 
C i v i l N o . : 
Cf Q^0035tH 
4. Plaintiff believes that mailing the Summons end 
Complaint to the defendant in care of his piace of employment is 
more likely to give the defendant notice of this lawsuit than 
publication in a local newspaper, and plaintiff requests that the 
Court order that service be effected upon the defendant by the 
Clerk of the Court mailing a copy of the Summons and Complaint to 
the defendant in care of his employment, Kemper Financial and that 
service shall be complete 30 days after ma-irlTTng 
Further
 5 your affiant sayeth nai^nt. 
STpTE^tf. KAUFMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thi-s-— ••prh--f-6&v/Jb^^UM^, 
NOTARY.PKM^ft &l"....-a -. :;-:- Y\ 
Residing-'io^^aii take~££z$H> 
My Coo&ii&es&yh^Lipires'i 3/25/91 
19< 
Utah 
FILED 
92 APR 13 PHV-57 i2i STEVEN M. KAUFMAN (#1777) of 2£ Ml «\ • ^  312450 25 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN
 Tp£ ^ ^ ^ 
GORMAN, JENSEN, MEDSKER & PERKINS C wrQT VA» LCT QEPT. 
Attorney for Plaintiff * U l ** 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-5526 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
] 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & COLLECTIONS 
A Utah Corporation 
Ogden 621-7880 ] 
Salt Lake City 485-1005 
Orem 224-5444 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
C O M P L A I N T 
MARYAM WHATLY & RICK WHATLY 
] Civil No. 
°*fendant/s.
 ] ^CC^^i 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and complains against Defendant and for 
cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. That the amount in controversy is less than $10,000.00. 
2. That Plaintiff is a licensed and bonded collection agercv 
in full compliance with all laws and regulations pertaining 
thereto. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
3. That Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of Plaintiff's 
assignor, Clayton Plastic Surgery, said debt having been incurred 
on 8-6-90. 
4. That Defendants are indebted to Plaintiff for the sum of 
$1373.27 for valuable goods and/or services rendered to defendants 
by Plaintiff's assignor plus interest to date of $96.11. 
5. That the subject obligation is a family expense and said 
Defendants are jointly and severally liable upon this indebtedness. 
6. That Defendant Maryarn Ulhatly signed an agreement providing 
for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee in the event of suit 
to collect and that the sum of $330.00 is a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
7. That Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of Plaintiff's 
assignor, Charles E. Parkin DMD PC, said debt having been incurred 
on 8-28-90. 
8. That Defendants are indebted to Plaintiff for the sum of 
$1932.33 for valuable goods and/or services rendered to defendants 
by Plaintiff's assignor plus interest to date of $135.2^. 
9. That the subject obligation is a family expense and said 
Defendants are jointly and severally liable upon this indebtedness . 
10. That Defendant Maryam Llhatley signed an agreement 
providing for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee in t.he 
event of suit to collect and that the sum of $330.00 is a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant 
in the amount of $1373.27, interest to date of $96.11 plus a 
reasonable attorney's fee 'of $330.00 in first cause of action; 
$1932.33, interest to date of $135.24 plus a reasonable attorney's 
of $330.00 in second cause of action; together with post-judgment 
interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum, and costs of court, 
and for such other further relief as tbre Court deems proper. 
DATED: February 11, 1992 
